September 11, 2015

International Politics and Conflict Resolution

Maria Raquel Freire

The current socioeconomic integration in South America allows us to argue that regional organizations such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur ) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur ) projects have been playing an important role in terms of the economic and political progress of their member states. Regional integration developed and improved in such way (Bach, 2005; Paupp, 2009; Ruiz and Zahrnt, 2008) that it became a priority among South American countries (Cardoso, 2006). Since the emergence or recovery of regional projects in the 1980s and 1990s, the study of regionalism has became prominent. Meanwhile, the remarkable development or intensifying of regional integration since then (Mercosur, ASEAN, NAFTA, even the stronger European Union) brought the studies of regionalism into the picture (Breslin et al., 2002). In this cooperative context, could the concept of hegemony as postulated by Antonio Gramsci (that is, beyond the realist tradition of power relations, and therefore also including the political and ideological dimensions) be applied to this geographical area and suggest that regionalism in South America has been an instrument to restrain the influence of the United States of America (hegemon)? This project aims to analyse the distinct levels and concepts of hegemony and apply them to regional integration, considered here as the promotion of common interests in a particular region (Fawcett, 2005), and to verify the existence, or not, of a de facto counter-hegemonic movement in South America.
The analysis of public policies at the level of civil society (relationship between civil and political dimensions) and their effects on the formation and/or maintenance of certain hegemonic groups from distinct countries (Boschi et al., 2000; Martinez, 1997) are transposed in this thesis to the international community, particularly through the strengthening of regionalism. Following Joseph (2002), this project argues that in presence of hegemony counter-hegemony dynamics will come into existence; a process that is intensified through the strengthening and deepening of regionalism as a way to curb the hegemon's influence. The rationale adopted here stresses the fact that the formation of an alternative source of regional hegemony, at the regional and international levels, bearing in mind the security, economic, and political/ideological dimensions of regionalism, might contribute to the international system by helping to reorder the present configuration of hegemony within the regional and international community.
We take regionalism as an alternative to the globalization process that might restrain, or at least become a movement capable of restraining the hegemon, in this case the USA's sphere of influence in South America (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008; Mukhametdinov, 2007) at distinct levels. On the one hand, this project helps to reconceptualize the role of regionalism at regional and international level in terms of ability to exercise hegemony, essentially by exposing the USA hegemony. On the other hand, it is intended to show how the potential emergence of counter-hegemonic movements in the South (in this case, South American regionalism) can effectively curb such influence. In addition, as shown in Figure 1, by assessing economic, political/ideological and security levels and assuming that the current configuration of South America is characterized by a "militarized peace", we intend to analyze how regionalism, through the counter-hegemonic movement formed in the region, contributes to maintaining (or increasing) security. Furthermore, by looking at the current structure of the international system (and in this case its re-organization) this study allows us to analyze its corollaries, particularly regarding the instrumentalization of peace in order to achieve global governance.
First, from an economic analysis of regionalism that starts with economic integration so as to strengthen member states' economies and thus improve their position within the international system. Second, by stressing the region's security as being an anomaly in light of peace studies, essentially due the low incidence of interstate armed conflicts. Finally, by pointing out the importance of political and ideological dynamics of imposing values and ideas' imposition at regional and international levels. Altogether these areas allow us to say that regionalism might be understood as a counter-hegemonic project from the South. Also relevant is the fact that the role of "clusters" of civil society participation/mobilization, to the point of influencing the position of a country, has been increasing dramatically in recent decades, to become the hegemon (elites) at domestic level among developed and developing countries. At about the same time as we have a boom in regional integration, it is important to stress here the role of history presented by Gramsci. What was previously the realm of political elites nowadays implies more complexity and involves public opinion, social and transnational movements, and shared interests that go further than the International Relation state-centrism. The intersection of domestic and international dealings in the different sectoral areas identified is therefore required so that hegemonic and counter-hegemonic movements can be analyzed.


Literature Review

To dissect the argument in light of its epistemological framework, it is necessary to understand why we argue that there is a counter-hegemonic movement in South American regionalism, mainly assessing, in the first place, what is understood by hegemony.
Apart from the realist concept of hegemony (Agnew, 2005; Daalder and Lindsay, 2003; Layne and Thayer, 2007) as synonymous with power relations, among scholars the notion has been influenced by the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci's work. Gramsci (1971), and later Robert W. Cox (Cox, 1981, 1983; Cox and Schechter, 2002), sought to develop a theory of hegemony that aimed to analyze social struggles linked to a specific period of time, and the importance of these social struggles to dominant political and social class formations. As Cox pointed out,

Hegemony is a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-states entities. In a hegemonic order these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. They appear to most actors as a natural order. Such a structure of meanings is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probable one state is dominant but that state´s dominance is not sufficient to create hegemony. Hegemony derives from the dominant social strata of dominant states in so far as these ways of doing and thinking have acquired the acquiescence of the dominant strata of other states (Cox, 1990 apud Gill, 1993: 42).

A realist interpretation of hegemony is grounded on a state's power dominance over others in relation to their material resources (Joseph, 2008; Keohane, 1984; Rupert, 1995), whereas the Structuralists' (Lechte, 2008; Sturrock, 2003) focus on a parallel reality beyond the visible actors (the structure) that impels domestic and international relations (through capitalism). For Gramsci and the neo-Gramscians (Bobbio, 1979; Cox, 1983; Femia, 1981a; Gill, 1993; Gruppi, 1978) hegemony involves an inherent complex of relations that explain the dominance of one group over another. Three core concepts are advanced: civil society, state, and historical blocs (Bobbio, 1979). Robert Bocock (1986) suggests a distinct division in Gramsci's proposal by separating it into three inter-connected areas: economics; civil society, and state, aiming to understand the complexity and variability of Gramsci's interpretation of power relations. The central point of hegemony in Gramsci is thus a blend of philosophy and practice within political life (Williams, 1960), which is a reformulation of Machiavelli's duality of political practice, taking it as being the practice of coercion to formulate consent (Arrighi, 1993; Cox, 1983). According to Bobbio (1979), the main distinction between Gramsci's and Marx's conceptualization of power relations and spheres of influence is related to the dichotomy between the relations of the structure with the superstructure. In sum, the structure is related to social production (mainly defined by Marx), which is interpreted as economics (Forgacs, 2000). The superstructure, on the other hand, according to the Italian philosopher, is formed by two distinct concepts: political society, which embraces the state apparatus, and civil society, which is the majority of the superstructure (Gramsci, 1971; Portelli, 1977). Hence, Gramsci's concept of hegemony assumes that ideology is more important than economics, and civil society (consensus) is more significant than political society (coercion). According to Texier (Texier, apud Mouffe and Sassoon, 2002), however, presenting structure-superstructure relations as a dichotomy, inherently conceiving as dominant (over the structure), is an equivocation. He suggests that there is a dialectical unity in which each may be conditioner or conditioned and not, as Bobbio (1979) suggests, mutually excluded. Portelli (Portelli apud Mouffe and Sassoon, 2002) argues that Gramsci's originality resides in overcoming this dichotomy with the concept of historical bloc, meaning that addressing the question of imposed primacy is worthless. But there is one constant: it is at the superstructure level that hegemony performs.
Therefore, for Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971: 12), the concept of civil society is characterized by socio-political forces that interact with its institutions in order to form their political identities; these are manifested by private institutions such as religion, schools, associations, and political parties, or in simplified terms, only "the private".
Closely connected with the concept of civil society is the concept of political society, or the state, which is part of the superstructure, and it is at this state level that civil society struggles occur.
By definition, states embrace both the use of violence (military forces) and bureaucracies (legal system, education, public services, the press, means of communication) (Bocock, 1986); in short, they represent what Lenin called the "dictatorship of the proletariat", meaning that it is through these channels of domination that the dominant class exerts its influence so as to maintain (or form) consensus. Hegemony thus permitted Gramsci to enlarge the concept of state, leading to a broader and a more complex formulation that would include the major props of political structures in civil society (Cox, 1983: 51), such as the institutions mentioned above.
The combination of all levels of society, i.e. political, civil and economic, would therefore form what Gramsci called the blocco storico or "the structures and superstructures form an historical bloc" (Gramsci, 1971; Gruppi, 1978; Portelli, 1977). This notion of hegemony should involve all levels of society (Gruppi, 1978), and so for a revolutionary event to happen it is crucial that the political and civil societies organize themselves with a view to replacing the previously imposed order. Cox affirms, however, that "a new bloc is formed when a subordinate class (e.g., the workers) establishes its hegemony over other subordinate groups (e.g., small farmers, marginals)" (Cox, 1983: 57). For a historical bloc to exist there must be a dominant or hegemonic social class, e.g. the elites, (Cox, 1983) in conjunction with other agents, which include the channels of influence used (political party, religion, military system, educational system, etc.) (Sassoon, 1987).
One of the goals of this work is to investigate the existence of what I call a "transnational historical bloc", represented by the regional institution Mercosur, as an alternative historical bloc. According to Gramsci, the complexity of this approach relies on the proximity of this concept to social class (re)organization, predominately attached to the national level.
There are at least two interpretations related to the possibility of transposing the national historical bloc formation to the international relations sphere and, consequently, of forming a possible "transnational historical bloc" through regionalism. The first scenario consists of a juxtaposition of member states' historical blocs whose international interests converge to maintain or improve both the domestic and international hegemonic status quo.
The "transnational historical bloc" is formed by the national (domestic) historical blocs of a certain regional organization. Bearing in mind that this latter is the combination of the dominant modes of production (structure) and the political and civil societies (superstructure), it is valid to affirm that the choice of integration serves the purposes and interests of the hegemon within national borders.
Another possible transnational historical bloc is a convergence between transnational relations of production (structures) interests, which, in a more integrated and globalised world, transcend state borders and are merged into regional organization commitments (legal and political norms).
In both cases, the concept of hegemony relies on a collective interest shared by the dominant classes. Even though Carnevali (Carnevali, 2005: 45) stresses the inapplicability of the Gramscian concept of historical bloc to the international arena, due its close connection with social class, it is fundamental to mention the importance of an emergent transnational class, based on shared capitalist interests. Under this conceptualization, the "transnationalization" of historical blocs would follow the natural course of a transnational capitalist class (see Robinson and Harris, 2000; Sklair, 2001; Sklair, 2002). Ultimately, the transnational capitalist class would embrace the neo-liberal order as one of its major premises, insofar as an elite-driven hegemonic project would be undertaken by certain capitalist groups whose intentions are reflected in an enlargement of their sphere of influence through a neo-liberal order. For example, the capitalist world was represented by the Bretton Woods system after the Second World War, and then in the 1970s by the readjustment of the Trilateral Commission, which is a private international forum that aims to promote the cooperation between the political and economic elites of the US, Europe and Japan in order to further its own interests (Gill, 1992).
If the structure and surface of hegemony is to be tackled so as to identify, in theoretical terms at least, which type of hegemony (or counter-hegemony) we are observing, Joseph (Joseph, 2002: 128) pointed out there is a need to distinguish a deeper aspect of hegemony, enhanced at the structural level, and a surface aspect of hegemony, concerned with hegemonic projects and actions. But the study of hegemony and counter-hegemonic projects requires this concept to be seen not as a tangible, static object of analysis, but as a complex, intricate phenomenon of interdependent social relations leading to a unique set of interpretations in each case studied (Joseph 2002: 131).
According to this line of thought, a counter-hegemonic movement should be manifest throughout the surface level (Joseph, 2002), but aim to re-formulate (or re-hierarchize) and alter the reproductive effects of the structural hegemony in the region affected by the struggle. Finally, Joseph analogously compared two concepts of power with the duality of hegemony, where the structural, deep aspect of hegemony concerns power 1, and the surface level matches the characteristics of power 2, using Bhaskar's definition of power (Bhaskar apud Joseph, 2002: 134). At the end, he concludes that for a counter-hegemonic or a hegemonic project to prevail and endure it should accumulate the conditions necessary, mentioned above, to operate across structural and civil hegemonies, and not only within them (idem: 135), that is, be transversal through them.
Debates among international scholars, even without being directly related to IR as a discipline, helped to understand the post-era of US dominance and leadership in the twentieth century by showing different perceptions of world orders. Regarding the hegemonic power of the USA, several authors recognize its importance to and presence in the world (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003; Fukuyama, 2006; Gill, 1992; Hudson, 2003; Jackson and Towle, 2006; Layne and Thayer, 2007; Mowle and Sacko, 2007; Pecequilo, 2003). However, in a shared hegemony (Santos, 2003), and despite the discourse regarding the rise or decline of the USA's sphere of influence (James, 2007; Zakaria, 2008), that often it is done by economic and military. Thus, dependencistas attempted to explain to what extent internal structures can be seen as obstacles to states' development and, furthermore, if these obstacles are normally imposed by exogenous factors. Despite dependencistas' authors having differing conceptions, they do converge in the belief that structural obstacles to national development are horizontal, what is part of domestic processes and class struggles (Larrain, 1989: 147).
Relevant works range from Pinto's analysis of Chile's economy in the 1930s, where he outlined how the Chilean economy had been exposed to both internal and external pressures and consequently became dependent, to Cardoso and Faletto who, according to Larrain, combined new categories of underdevelopment and dependency in South America with the traditional postulates of Marxism (Larrain, 1989: 159). These authors emphasize that the dependency established in the peripheral countries is intimately related to "the historical transformation of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggles" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979 apud Larrain, 1989: 160 ). But Cardoso and Faletto also argued that "the changes occurring in the capitalist world system do not produce similar automatic changes all over the periphery, but find a concrete expression through local interests, state policies and class struggles" (ibidem) .
Nonetheless, authors such as Cardoso and Faletto describe the importance of internal social rearrangement, emancipated from Marxism's reductionism and proxy for the broader sense of structure/agent relations that this work hopes to establish.
According to this viewpoint, hegemony could ultimately be regarded as a structure (Cox, 1983), since it is through its mechanisms of leadership that consent is created, and so the hegemon maintains or improves its status quo on the basis of international movements of capital.
So far we have outlined the major components of structuralism in different schools of thought, and shown that it does interact with the concept of hegemony. These conceptualizations of structuralism should not be taken strictly, however, since there is no clear pre-established image of what structuralism really represents, thanks to the variety of interpretations of it (Cravinho, 2002). Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that the structuralists' arguments on hegemony, discussed above, are considered crucial to understanding the transnational capital's interrelations and material resources. A similar position is taken by the realist view of hegemonic projects.
An assessment of the concept of "shared hegemony" is needed for this. Santos shows how the formation of the present universal hegemon (the USA), especially after the Cold War, is no longer omnipresent in the international system (Santos, 2003: 46-48). In order to explain the new hegemonic centre of today, Santos relies on Kondratiev cycles to identify the actual moment for the critical timing of a global change (Santos, 2003: 50). He sees this as the most reasonable explanation for the creation of the Trilateral Commission (the United States of America, Europe and Japan) in the mid-1970s (idem: 84), consistent with the offensive cooperative hegemony upheld by Pedersen and the spread of these hegemons' influence. Santos stresses the fact that the strengthening of regional organizations is a new trend in the reconfiguration of the international system, pointing to the role of Mercosur in the deeper and wider integration of South American countries and the role played by Brazil which is, according to him, the regional hegemon (Santos, 2003: 100-101). In spite of this, Pomfret draws attention to the fact that regionalism (mostly initiated by regional trade agreements) has become more and more an irreversible feature of the global economy, achieving unprecedented levels since the 1990s (Pomfret, 2007). Pedersen (2002) discusses the relationship between power, institutions, forms of domination and leadership, forming what he calls "co-operative hegemony". Stressing different interpretations of regionalism within mainstream IR theories (neoliberal, rational choice, and neorealism institutionalisms), these may be offensive, where the actor presumes to expand its sphere of influence through diffusion and inclusion, or defensive, where the benefits of stabilization are the goal (idem: 686). Pedersen's and Santos' point of view on this is that the present international order's configuration is mainly dictated by power-sharing achieved by a complex system of alliances in which regional organizations have become the ultimate form. So even though the Trilateral Commission was necessary for the hegemon to re-establish its strategies of leadership throughout the world, regionalism could be understood as a movement that is attempting to halt or diminish this process.
One last aspect concerning the formation of hegemonic projects and their dynamics in relation to establishing consensus is Burges' concept of "consensual hegemony" (Burges, 2008). He has suggested that it is possible to extend hegemonic power without necessarily resorting to forms of domination, and that Pedersen's cooperative hegemony could end up as a consensual hegemony in the light of Gramscian thought (Burges, 2008: 69-72).
The literature on regionalism, from the point of view of a cohesive definition within IR theories so far, is much less developed than that on hegemony. The rise of regions instead of a worldwide cohesive block has nonetheless been the subject of analysis by scholars in different areas (Bach, 2005; Das, 2004; Pomfret, 2007; Wunderlich, 2007). But it is still fundamental to distinguish between regions, regionalism and regionalization. Fawcett points out that regions are units based on shared characteristics, which might be permanent or institutionalized; Regionalism thus implies a harmonization of common interests in order to achieve regional cohesion in one or more areas; finally, regionalization which is essentially a process that concentrates activities at the regional level (Fawcett, 2005: 24-25).
In sum, theoretically, this project aims to relocate the current position of regionalism within international relations theories, bearing in mind its intrinsic complexity presented by Hettne (Hettne, 1999 apud Hurrell, 2005: 42), where the traditional impossibility of taking place in this matter. My argument is therefore that, regarding the dimensions proposed above for the achievement of counter-hegemony, regionalism meets the requirements to establish its place within IR theories, despite its correlation with the globalization process (Hurrell, 2005) imposed by the USA (hegemon).

Conceptual Proposal

The concept of hegemony goes beyond economic or military power as a domination form (realist view) and in its full meaning it incorporates ideological, cultural and social dimensions, thereby corresponding to the precise concept of coercion, intrinsically associated with consensus formation (Cox, 1981, 1983; Femia, 1981b, 2008; Gruppi, 1978; Joseph, 2002). In this context, our research question asks whether we are looking at a movement in the Southern Cone that constrains the present forms of domination in the region, imposed by the USA.
As shown in Figure 1, the project aims to explore this research question by presenting three hypotheses. Thus, firstly, an attempt will be made to explore how economic integration may be understood as a fundamental and crucial dynamic of regionalism in order to achieve development (like the European Union for example). In other words, is regionalism an instrument to achieve economic development?
We thus try to assess the relationship between economic development and regionalism as one aspect/condition of a form of counter-hegemony.
Our first hypothesis will also assess whether we are faced with a unipolar (Mentioned at Pedersen, 2002), cooperative (Pedersen, 2002)/shared (Santos, 2003) or consensual (Burges, 2008) hegemony, in terms of international relations. This project assumes that the current hegemony is shared. According to Pedersen (Pedersen, 2002: 687), "cooperative hegemony" is inversely (directly) related to "unilateral hegemony", and as he puts it, while "co-operative hegemony promises benefits, especially long-term benefits, it also involves costs". The main differences between these two concepts, as the author sees them.

If we transpose these arguments to South America's regionalism it is easy to see the problems arising from the disadvantages pointed out by Pedersen. In fact, it is difficult to see how Brazil and Venezuela, for example, which have the same (left) political leaning, can agree on certain aspects of foreign policy, such as regional integration, and at the same time disagree drastically on the relationship with the United States of America, or on speeding up the Free Trade Area of Americas - FTAA - process. Another aspect that has been a prime target for critics of the relative failure of Mercosur's member states applies to Brazil and relates to deepening the integration process. To be the region's natural leader/hegemon necessarily implies costs and flexibility in relation to key features of regional trade agreements (common external tariff, for instance), a price that Brazil so far has been reluctant to pay. But the fact that Venezuela is in the process of joining the bloc and its initiatives and different relationships with other countries will change this scenario. The official position of Brazilian foreign policy is that emerging countries are more susceptible to external influences than developed countries. In fact, Brazil and Venezuela have started to fight, though not openly, for the legitimate leadership of Mercosur and other groups. The most recent example of this leadership contest in regional politics may be seen in the formation of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), where these countries have developed mechanisms of understanding and consensus-forming in issues where agreement is hard to achieve, like energy problems. These external factors that influence the domestic/regional policies of countries directly affect the decisions taken in relation to regional integration, which are usually long-term policies.
The concept of cooperative hegemony presented by Pedersen has some similarities with Santos' (2003) conceptualization of shared and consensual hegemony, mentioned above. At the moment we cannot disregard any of these three interpretations of hegemony within and across Mercosur's regional and international insertion. So Pedersen's cooperative approach, together with Santos' shared hegemony, provides the logical understanding of regional powers' cooperation, as an outcome of the globalization process itself. As Robinson noted,

Globalization upsets the ability of individual states … to regulate economic activity within national borders, to capture and redistribute surpluses, to harmonize conflicting social interests, and to realize their historic function of sustaining the internal unity of nationally conceived social formation (Robinson, 1996: 35).

Although with some reservations, the consensual hegemony advocated by Burges still has some relevance to understanding the balance of power in the region. For example, Brazilian foreign policy opted to practise a non-interventionist type of hegemony, although it has been regarded, as mentioned, as the most influential country in the Mercosur bloc. But it would be prudent to stress the fact that this "consent" without "domination" should be applied very carefully to this case study, since it has been argued that for a counter-hegemonic movement to exist there must also be the country's "willingness" to exercise hegemony.
So what then did Mercosur's formation represent for the re-configuration of socio-economic-political influence, both locally and globally? In assessing the dimensions of hegemony and its repercussions at the domestic, regional and global levels, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects have been intrinsic to the analysis of the question of relative power.
But there were/are at least two significant conditions influencing the relative failure of the premises proclaimed by Mercosur's members: first, the notorious asymmetries among its members, with Brazil and Argentina on one side, and Paraguay and Uruguay on the other; and second, the high concentration of neoliberal projects within domestic structures, as part of the exogenous influence of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, derived from the structure of the international system and the debt crisis in the 1980s. In relation to this, the sum of (exercised) power and fragility of South American regionalism today configures the importance of effective leadership in the region. This thesis will focus on the balance of power of Brazil, Argentina and, more recently, Venezuela, for analysis.
The underlying question related to cohesion or disagreement in South American countries relative to their different forms of integration is whether they are individual or collective hegemonic projects. Can it be said, then, that the economies of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela are more competing than complementary? There is no consensus about this in the international relations community at present (see Burges, 2007, 2008; Carranza, 2003; Mecham, 2003). In this regard, the characterization and identification of such distinct types of hegemonies and their effect on South American regionalism are directly related, according to our argument, to the formation of a counter-hegemony, which is inserted into the regional system's restructuring, as propounded by this work.
In our second hypothesis, we intend to relate regionalism and its content in terms of security issues in South America. Thus, in terms of regional security we intend to problematize the aspects of this region and the consequences arising from the deepening of such integration. So, could regionalism be seen as an instrument of peace?
Even though it is not possible to establish a causal nexus between security and economic development, via regional integration, in South America, it would at least be prudent to say that these two concepts are mutually interdependent. We intend to briefly show how the paradoxical nature of conflict in South America is the source of both economic stability and instability, causing political disputes. The importance of this approach to security is that it is normally seen as being one of the most quoted constraints on South American regionalism, particularly, among Mercosur's member states, and even more especially between Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela.
Focusing on the nature of the conflicts within the field of conflict studies and conflict resolution, the South America region is often characterized as being an "anomaly" in terms of the occurrence of inter-state conflicts (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Mares, 2001). But this does not mean that South America should be regarded as a peaceful region. Disputes and grievances , normally arising from territorial disputes , plus asymmetries between South American countries, explain why this region is termed a "zone of relative peace" rather than a "peaceful zone" (Holsti, 1996: 161), and so it is marked by a "negative peace" (Galtung, 1969). This feature definitely forms the basis for the unique conflict resolution system of South American countries.
Meanwhile, the path towards economic integration taken by South American countries in the 1990s has brought countries together, although the relevance of these factors is not measurable. One outcome is appeasement or preventing the escalation of conflict arising from domestic and/or diplomatic disputes to the level armed conflict. Apart from sporadic cases, conflict resolution in South America has very often used negotiation and diplomacy in the settlement of disputes, which makes it useful to think of improved security from a regional point of view. In fact, there are some advantages to studying security from a regional rather than a global perspective. For instance, Diehl pointed out that it is better to created consensus among regional organizations' member states than in global organizations (Diehl, 2007). It is associated with a clear definition of the interests of member states, thus enabling proper engagement in the search for alternative solutions to possible armed conflicts (Lake and Morgan apud Buzan and Wæver, 2003:10). Furthermore, Pevehouse noted that, in addition to the economic links - and their inherent effects - between regional organizations' member states, the democratic element widely found in South American regionalism (Mercosur and Unasul) has a fundamental role in the prevention of armed conflict (Pevehouse, 2005). So what is important here is the fact that security and economic development are ever-present issues for political elites and civil society in South America, and all hegemonic projects should consider them .
Finally, our last hypothesis refers to the consequences of political and ideological cohesion among South American countries. Even though this exists, is regionalism a source of political and ideological power? At this point, we shall asses the manifold aspects of regionalism in terms of the values, concepts, behaviours that are imposed by the present hegemon and how Southern countries react to them. This level of comprehension requires an assessment of the Gramscian concept of passive revolution. This conceptualization advocates that whenever a ruling class (of transnational actors) begins to crumble and a period of crisis ensues, the process of re-establishing hegemony is characterized by a passive revolution. In sum, whenever restructuring is organized from above (Gramsci, 1971; Simon, 1982). Another aspect of such reorganization in terms of political and ideological thoughts stresses the fact that restructuring should take place from within the present international system, a thesis advocated by Pebrish. But Samir Amin argues that the more southern countries interact together with the developed countries the more dependent they become on the latters' politics (ideas and values), therefore a rupture would have to present radical policies (Cravinho, 2002). This thesis therefore takes the first argument, that is, regionalism often uses values and ideas imposed by the hegemon (such as democracy, free-market, state of law, etc.) in order to employ them for the reorganization of the international system.
To sum up, the central goal of this project is to examine how regionalism, through the analysis of economic development, security and the political/ideological dimension, can meet the conditions to achieve counter-hegemony. It takes Mercosur/Unasur as a case study. Thus, looking at the concept of hegemony from a realist to a neo-Gramscian view helps us to understand how and in what context counter-hegemony is formed, along with its sphere of influence at the regional and international levels.


Methodology

Three research methods are adopted: literature review, discourse analysis and content analysis. The discourse analysis method, which considers the social, political and economic configuration in South America (as a counter-hegemonic perspective), allows us to ascertain the effects on the regional and international scenario, and so political discourse will be a crucial tool for analyzing how political elites form (or not) consent. The main goal of this methodology is to assess the nature of language, whose objective here is to identify and catalogue the channels of consensus formation at both, regional and international level.
Along with the methodological path just described we intend to use content analysis as a complementary research method. This method allows us to scrutinize elements of hegemony (actors, events, the press, etc.) and counter-hegemony throughout regionalism's deepening in both theory and practice. Epistemologically the research method described is subject to different interpretations and theoretical perceptions that could be open to question without an organized and mapping of units of analysis (content). Furthermore, content analysis permits the confirmation of political, economic and social changes over time (history), which is all-important to Gramscian postulates of hegemony and its formation. Political discourses, regional and international organizations' reports, economic groups' reports, and academic articles are among our sources of analysis.
Lastly, regarding the methodology, the project will use another resource: field research, particularly based on interviews. These will be conducted with regional political elites, academics and government authorities with a view to understanding the existing linkages between North (USA) and South (South America) political elites' interests.
As has already been outlined, the case study will be composed of Mercosur's member states and the UNASUR project. We intend to demonstrate how regionalism has influenced or changed their status quo as regional organizations within the international system, by using the methodology described above.
When it was created one of Mercosur's main goals was to coordinate macro-economic policies among its members (Martins and Carcanholo, 2005). Thus the Treaty of Assunción announces the establishment of a common market establishing: (a) the free movement of goods, services and factors of production; (b) a common external tariff, and (c) the adoption of a common trade policy in relation to third states or groups of states (Treaty of Assunción, Article I). Mercosur's trajectory after its creation involved successive attempts at consolidation. For example, the Protocol of Ouro Preto, in 1994, gave the bloc "international legal personality" and elevated it from a free trade area to a customs union, the Protocol of Brasilia, which redefined the mechanisms for resolving controversies, the Protocol of Ushuaia, signed in 1998, which established the democratic clause for participants, and finally, the Protocol of Olivos (2002) which marked the re-launch of Mercosur's integration vis-à-vis international crises and its inherent stagnation. Here, as always, it is necessary to bear in mind the regional and international context in order to better understand the pros and cons of regionalism in South America, mostly due to the high dependence on external factors in economic and cohesion terms.
In the early years of its existence, and especially after the 1994 signing of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, Mercosur achieved an impressive degree of integration and intra-bloc convergence, growing about 400% up to 1998 in terms of economic trade (Drummond, 2003: 88). The Asian financial crisis of 1997 had an impact on South America in mid-1998 early 1999, which resulted in serious disagreements among Mercosur's member states and led Brazil to take the most significant action related to the integration process in this period: the devaluation of its currency. International crises continued to drag South American countries into recession and instability, and in 2001 the economic collapse of Argentina weakened the integration process still further. In a way, these two crises made it possible for Brazil and Argentina to bring their economies closer together. These events were followed by an attempt to re-launch the very basis of economic integration (2002 onwards), and at the same time expand it to other strata to create cohesion.
The idea of a counter-hegemonic movement throughout regionalism, keeping in mind the three dimensions proposed, i.e. security, economic and political/ideological, necessarily raises the question: why South America? Because, for the purposes of the argument expounded, South American regionalism meets the basic requirements of counter-hegemony and follows a natural evolution in order to upset the international order. So from Mercosur to Unasur, that region stand out, where Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela have increasingly enhanced their role at the regional and international levels.
Regarding the economic, security and political/ideological dimensions of Mercosur's member states and bearing in mind its importance in terms of ability to give a direction to regionalism, this thesis intends to analyze the positions of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela within Mercosur and Unasur.


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