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CENTRALITY, POLITICAL ATTITUDES
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CLASS STRUCTURE AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN PORTUGAL

– State centrality, political attitudes and practices in a changing context *

Our participation in the International Research Project on Social Classes has been an opportunity to test the explanatory power of the neomarxist class analysis (based on Erik Olin Wright's model, 1985, 1997) in the context of the Portuguese society. Integrating that project gave us the possibility not only to understand the Portuguese class structure in a more systematic way but also to compare our results with some of the developed societies that have been studied with the same theoretical matrix. As our main results are far from being totally coherent with the general features of the conclusions for those societies, we assume that this is mainly due to the very specificities of our society and its recent historical and political processes.

* This paper has been presented at the *VIII International Meeting of the Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness - RECONFIGURATIONS OF CLASS AND GENDER*, at the University House, Australian National University, Canberra, 1-3 August 1997. The Portuguese Project was funded by the National Board for Scientific and Technological Research (JNICT) and has been developed at the Center for Social Studies (CES) – University of Coimbra. I'd like to thank Erik Olin Wright and his team in Madison for the great help he gave us with his stimulating knowledge, and advice in the beginning of our project. Also our thanks to Juan Jesus Gonzalez (Universidad Nacional de Educacion A Distancia de Madrid) for his collaboration and orientation in helping us in the first stages of this project.

Of course we knew that the indicators used in a comparative analysis would hardly give us a full account of the contextual and historical aspects that are at stake when considering the class structure of a given society. In fact, it is not possible to import a theoretical model from one society to another and use it mechanically specially when it comes from a core to a peripheral or semiperipheral country. So, one of the major interests in debating the Portuguese project is particularly due to the perplexities and reflections that may be drawn from our results at this stage.

Bearing this in mind, we tried to analyze the data of the Portuguese research in light of the historical and socio-economic particularities of our society, such as: the strong State tradition, especially the marks left by the long period of Salazar's authoritarian regime; the recent democratization process initiated only in the mid 1970's — with the "Revolution of Carnations" (April 25, 1974) — and the socio-political upheavals caused by the popular movements of 1974-75; a late and fragile technological modernization; a capitalistic economy slowly recovering (only during the 80's) from a period of nationalizations and institutional paralysis of the State; and finally, the existence of an industrial system reorganized under the stabilizing influence of the democratic regime and its adherence to the European Community. In spite of the present effort to achieve the development patterns of other European countries, Portugal still remains a semiperipheral society, whose production and market dynamics combine with non-capitalistic logics in the sociocultural field. All these processes made profound changes in our society during the last two decades. As other studies have shown (Almeida *et al*, 1994), different fluxes of social mobility occurred in this period, which have had a significant effect on the reconfiguration of the Portuguese class structure. Therefore, to be able to explain results that are partially incongruent within a more abstract level of analysis, one must pay close attention to these contextual and historical particularities.

I will start with a brief description of the class structure in our country and then consider the question of class consciousness, the role of the State and the subjective positions of the Portuguese population regarding the control of several economic activities and services by the State and, finally, examine political trends, experiences of association and participation in public protests.

1. The Comparative Matrix of the Class Structure

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

Generally speaking, one could say that our results attest to the complex and contradictory way in which the structure of social classes has been developing in Portugal. This structure (see Table 1) is immediately recognizable as different from that of core countries when one looks at the significant weight of the petty bourgeoisie, even knowing that the rural sector has been declining, it is still very significant with 12,4%. This is a result of the late development of the country both in economical and in technological terms. The most deprived category of the “proletarians” has a major percentage presence in Portuguese society (with 46,5%) both in relation to other class categories and in comparison to other countries. However this is not only a sign of the existence of nonskilled industrial workers, but rather an indication that the labor market has been creating several sectors of precarious labor relations, requiring low levels of education and autonomy within the sphere of production. The threat of unemployment creates labor situations of great dependency and it seems to be contributing to new areas of proletarianization, including some located in the tertiary sector.

The middle class locations are much smaller than the ones found in Sweden and the USA. But there are signs of growth in some of the most skilled sectors, as in the case of expert non-managers and expert managers. This is related to the accelerated growth of higher education and to a certain modernization in some production sectors which are

trying to challenge the global market. One can imagine that access to employment will soon and increasingly depend on the resources of one's credentials. Presently, however, the job positions that combine authority with a low level of education are those which are closer, in percentual terms, to the correspondent positions in the core countries. On the other hand, the values for those who occupy power positions and also controls high levels of credentials are less significant in Portugal than in those countries.

(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

Our class structure is significantly marked by a State sector that is an important employer, namely in the case of middle-class locations (with the exception of proletarians, the vast majority of wage labourers are State employees). State administration developed too late and too rapidly specially in sectors that were traditionally feminine, like education or health care, social work or social security, etc. As a result, skilled female labor is increasingly showing its relevance. Actually, our research shows that the levels of sexual discrimination are much lower in Portugal than in core countries (see Table 2). In the sexual composition of class structure, especially within the middle-class positions, one notices that in certain categories women's presence is stronger than men's, mainly in those categories which require higher credentials. This situation is extremely significant when we consider the most developed countries (USA and Sweden), where differences in sexual distribution show a higher level of female discrimination. Particularly in intermediate categories, such as managers, experts, supervisors and skilled workers, women are, in Portuguese society, closer to men, and in some cases they already have a higher presence, as can be seen in Table 2. Simultaneously, at the proletarians' location (where the scarcity of resources is more obvious), women's presence is lower than (although close) to men's, contrary to what happens in Sweden and the USA where the same class locations are much more feminized.

2. Class Consciousness and Ideological Formations

If the distinction between *class in itself* and *class for itself* still makes sense, it is the former, not the latter, that applies for a marxist class analysis. In any case, contrary to the Leninist volunteer approach which believed that “proletarians have nothing to lose except their chains”, our recent history seems to sustain de Tocqueville’s well-known statement by proving that “those who have nothing to loose are those who rebel less”. We all know that the Welfare State system “offered” to the European proletarians (in the post-war) contributed to the weakening of the socialist utopia and, thus, *class for itself* becomed more and more a non-relevant concept. Even after the decline of that system, new trends and forms of collective intervention placed class in a secondary position in the field of political action.

In Portugal, the Welfare State was never fully developed (Santos, 1990 & 1994). However, the recent birth of some of its forms of social assistance (Mozzicafreddo, 1997) coincides with the growth of structural unemployment and the increasing submission of the labor force to capitalist interests and with the diminishing of union’s strength and political participation. The fragmentation of the Portuguese working class and the loss of its power of negotiation seems to fit in with the general trends of global capitalism. Capital is reinforcing disciplinary mechanisms within the production space and the logics of consent seem stronger than the logics of class struggle (Burawoy, 1979, 1985). In the last decade, in regions where union and labor cultures formerly were strong (industrial vortexes in Lisbon, Oporto and Setúbal), after the State intervention of the 1970’s, there were processes of privatization of some important enterprises with the inevitable organizational restructuring, “compulsive retirements” and dismissals. On the other hand, in regions of diffused industrial production (especially in the northern and central coastal areas of Portugal), where small firms are dominant (for instance, the textile and footwear industries), the industrial structure remains very fragmented and mixed with forms of

pluri-activity and precarious labor relations (Reis, 1992). The subjectivities rooted in contexts like these, with a strong sense of community, seem to favour loyalties that undermine class relations and reproduce relations of consent between workers and employers within firms.

These contextual aspects help us to understand some incoherences of the Portuguese results when it comes to questions of class consciousness and class structure. Other dimensions of our analysis highlight these aspects, namely the data concerning associations and public protests, which I will address below. It seems clear that the loss of the centrality of classes in the context of social struggle is produced by the economic processes of capital globalization. The link between class and the subjectivity of the collective actors in struggle seems to be increasingly determined by the macro-social contexts and conjunctures (Balibar, 1991). In spite of individual subjectivities still being shaped by the class structure, there is an enormous variety of other processes at play. Of course, we must reject explanations of a deterministic nature and try to understand, for instance, why some of the privileged class categories (expert managers) show a more pronounced anti-capitalist consciousness than the proletarians.

When analyzing the results of subjective identification with a particular class in Portuguese society, we learn that proletarians and the petty bourgeoisie are very close. Both categories identify with the working-class in 62% of the responses. Concerning this aspect, it is also very interesting to observe that a significant percentage of employers (42%) identify with the working-class as well. The reason for this must be that, on one side, most small employers have a working class origin and, on the other side, most workers (or at least their families) are also small land-owners or engaged in complementary economic activities. Some sectors of the working class are in fact “contradictory class locations”. The notion of “work” also carries an enormous symbolic charge which is deeply rooted in our society. Of course, work is the main source for

domestic accumulation in the popular classes. Nevertheless, small bosses and the petty bourgeoisie (contrary to other class locations), seems to stay away from leisure and cultural activities and dedicate their free-time to work¹. Many of these small employers have accumulated some wealth by working very hard and they are extremely proud of that. We find a totally different attitude in the case of workers who control more credential assets (middle-class): they likely adopt urban cultural values and consumer habits and that is why they identify with the middle-class². This means that credentials are more decisive than property to these particular categories. However, the same cannot be said in the case of capitalists. The size of the property and the fact of being the boss is what really matters. The difference in percent values between small employers and capitalists is as large as the one between capitalists and proletarians. The Portuguese petty bourgeoisie is indeed in many aspects — both economic and socio-cultural — indistinguishable from the working-class.

(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)

As a matter of fact, in terms of the class consciousness scale the Portuguese results are more incongruent than the ones of other countries³. The degree of consciousness more clearly related to the working-class is found in the skilled supervisors (see Table 3). Indeed, this category is located at the extreme positive result (+2,56) contrary to the capitalists' location, which is the lowest value obtained (-0,22). The nonskilled supervisors (+1,93), the expert managers (+1,90) and the expert non-managers (+1,65) are also shown as anti-capitalist class locations in terms of their ideological

¹ This has been shown in the results of our survey, as well. But they are not included here.

² The results of the subjective identification with the working class are: 25% of skilled workers; 44% of the nonskilled supervisors and only 9% of the expert supervisors; 45% of the nonskilled managers and only 4% of the expert managers; 47% of the small employers and 0% of the capitalists.

³ In Portugal the regression equations used to measure class consciousness in the class location were not very effective. I decided to mention this comparative results even knowing the very tight explanatory power of class locations over class consciousness. Class location can only explain 3% of the variation, against the 6% of the USA and the 13% of Sweden.

positionings. The proletarians' category, for instance, locates itself in a more moderate position (+1,45), which means that proletarians are less anti-capitalist than categories like nonskilled supervisors, expert managers and expert non-managers.

These results emphasize the small degree of variation in the class consciousness scale (which in theory should oscillate between -7 and +7) and the relative dislocation of the values towards a positive trend. The capitalists' location is the only one with a negative value. We can therefore conclude that, generally speaking, Portuguese society is still fairly permeated by non-capitalist subjectivities. The importance of a rural petty bourgeoisie as well as the logics of traditional identity and the strong presence of the State in Portuguese society during this century – especially during the four decades of Salazar's dictatorship – are to be found amongst the crucial factors in this respect. Another contributing factor was the intense experience of political participation during the “revolutionary years” (1974-1975) which deeply marked all social classes of that generation: collective protests and demonstrations, strikes, popular associations and movements, reorganizations and direct worker-management of firms, etc., have been important experiences of this period.

After the capitalists, nonskilled managers and the petty bourgeoisie are the categories which present the lowest values in the class consciousness (values of +0,72 and +0,94, respectively). The skilled supervisors constitute the most overtly anti-capitalist category. We cannot find a conclusive explanation for this. As skilled supervisors are the most ambiguous position of the class locations matrix, they seem to be showing their discontent with a system that does not allow for their career progression in terms of what they expected given their qualifications and credential assets.

On the other hand, small employers exhibit ideological tendencies that are relatively closer to a pro-working-class attitude. In this case, one must always bear in mind the limited number of capitalist employers and the weight of small employers who

feel that, compared to what happens with big firms, they are relegated to a secondary position, for example when it comes to State support.

3. The Role of the State in the Structuring of Class Positions

The introduction of other variables, such as the distinction between the public and private sectors, does not significantly change the fact that the class structure is not an important determinant of class consciousness. Curiously, employees who work for the State show a more pro-capitalist ideology than those who work for the private sector. This is confirmed by looking at the different items of class consciousness, where we can read, for instance, that when it comes to the question of forbidding the hiring personnel to replace workers on strike. In the public sector the expert managers (36%) and the supervisors (33%) are in favor while the same categories in the private sector either totally disagree (0% of pro-capitalist answers in the case of the managers), or they only agree in 20% of the cases (for the supervisors). On the more abstract questions, such as the possibility of the existence of a society where profit is not important, the pattern is repeated. 71% of the managers in public sector disagree, while only 57% in private sector share the same position; with supervisors the pattern is repeated and shows greater differences: 83% of those working in the public sector are pro-capitalist as opposed to only 20% in the private sector.

A possible explanation for these results may lie in the proximity between managers and workers in the private sector, since both categories suffer the employers' pressure to create a more disciplined production and higher profits. But, at the same time in small firms this pressure tend to be articulated with strong loyalty ties which are intrinsic aspects of some regions or industrial sectors. The substitution of workers on strike is forbidden by law, but this legal victory led to new forms of labor market flexibility, such as short term contracts, major control and discipline in the private sector, and gave rise to precarious work conditions. In the public sector, on the contrary,

bureaucracy offers more security and therefore efficiency and productivity tend to be reduced as hierarchies became more strict and formalized.

(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)

Portuguese attitudes towards State control of diverse economic services and sectors can help us understand the discrepancies mentioned above as well as to place the question in a more general context (see Table 4). In fact, the high percentages of answers favoring State control over economic activities are the most obvious in our scale of results. But, contrary to what happens in other countries (USA), “pro-statism” does not mean “pro-socialism”. It means instead that there is a power distance regarding State institutions and a major insecurity and dependency towards them. There are however some differences between class categories in this respect and these seem to be directly related to differences in credential assets. In the case of those who have been able to use some of the State supplies in a more fruitful way — those who are more educated and therefore better informed — their pro-statist position is less visible. Locations with less educational resources and more distant from the institutional logics are the ones that more clearly trust the State.

The many forms of State action, the dialectical combination of their presence with their absence — the perverse and complementary effects of its action-omission contradictory logic, as Santos argues (1993) — seem to result in increased demands for protection by those who are more distant from the institutional State logic and political game: this is the case of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletarians.

The formal restriction of State economic control does not necessarily translate into the loss of its centrality in the social, economic and political arena. One could think of the hypothesis of managers and experts (a significant part of which is employed in the public sector) developing their attitudes in a double way: either the reduction of public

administration makes the State more selective and flexible, insuring that way their institutional privileges; or it will allow for the autonomous reinforcement of the private sector, which could mean that those class categories would have better opportunities for showing their skills and therefore achieving comparatively better rewards and advantages. One or both of these subjectivities could justify the relative skepticism of the managers and supervisors regarding the State.

4. Political Positionings and Associative Experiences

(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)

In terms of the political positionings the trend “moderate-centre” is dominant in all class categories (see Table 5). Besides there is still a difference between “centre-left” and “centre-right”, this leads us to believe that the traditional polarity left-right is more and more undermined as a reference for the political-ideological positionings. Probably the widening gap between political parties and populations is an important cause for that situation. On the other hand, our results are a clear indication that significant sectors of the electorate is moving from “left” towards “centre-left” attitudes. Our research took place during the summer of 1995, just a few months before the elections that were won by the Socialist party (today with a more moderate and less socialist orientation than in the past). As for the “right-wing” trends, it is the petty bourgeoisie — owning some property but with low economic capital and even lower credentials — that seems to be adopting those positions, immediately followed by the managers and the employers. Small employers situate themselves at the “centre”, apparently trying to show their neutrality and distance from the political debate. But the “conservatism” of the petty bourgeoisie (especially the rural one) must be related to factors such as the importance of Catholicism, the strong ties to traditional communities and, therefore, a wider vulnerability in face of local ideologies that combat the ideas of “socialism” or “communism” always related to the left.

As one might expect, “left wing” trend is observable at the other extreme of the matrix. Proletarians and especially experts non-managers are the two categories that are more radical on such questions. But if it is a fact that in terms of their political positionings proletarians do affirm their belonging to the left, it is also true that, when we observe their association practices or their participation in public protests, the sociological conclusion that those who are more exploited are not the ones that rebel the most proves to be correct. Class struggle depends on collective organizations capable of defending the interests of a class or class alliances. In an opposite fashion, the participation in experiences of collective mobilization interferes with the class structure and simultaneously with the actors’ shaping of their subjective representations (see Table 6).

(TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE)

The managers’ case is interesting from this perspective: the privileges they possess, together with their high academic credentials and their positions of authority, place them at the “right-wing” tendency, but at the same time they are deeply involved in party and association activities ⁴. Therefore managers’ militancy must be seen more as part of an instrumental logic than of an emancipatory or rebellious sentiment. Specially when one considers their privileged positions and ‘rightist’ orientation and bears in mind that the political party most supported by these social sectors (Social Democratic Party - PSD, generally considered ‘moderate-right’) has been on power during the last 10 years and actively promoting this type of supporter. The other middle-class categories (skilled managers and expert non-managers, for instance) are also active participants in these public protests, but the managers are even more involved in political parties and attracted by party activities.

⁴ On the whole, the participation in association activities (sporting, religious, professional, political) reaches 20% while party affiliation does not go beyond 9,5%.

In any case, some of these middle-class sectors are, at present, clearly participating in the recomposition of class practices in Portugal. Skilled workers show that they still have a sense of class struggle that is close to the traditional forms of workers' mobilization (with a larger percentage of union affiliation and strike participation). On the other hand, expert non-managers, perhaps because they are younger, controls more academic credentials and clearly feeling a part of the middle-class, show themselves to be more distanced from party activity and political or union demonstrations. In spite of this, they are the class category that has participated the most in non-union and non-political public protests in the past two years (see Table 7).

(TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE)

I interpret the relative withdrawal of proletarians from association activities and public protests as related to the general landscape of consumption massification – material, symbolic and cultural, which is, of course, highly mediated by television – and with the increasing bureaucratization of the democratic institutions and political parties. These factors push the average citizen and the working classes away from the State and away from political action. The huge deficit of democratic citizenship (Santos, 1994; Mozzicafreddo, 1997), together with the problems of unemployment, violence, poverty and social exclusion, are dominant traits of present Portuguese society. Popular discontent may therefore translate into forms of conservative radicalism (as is the case of the recent demonstrations against gypsies) instead of creating emancipatory practices and subjectivities.

If the building of citizenship and the emergence of new social movements ever happens in Portugal, that is, if there is a possibility for the construction of a radical and democratic citizenship in our country (Mouffe, 1996), it seems probable that those processes and struggles will come from the mobilization of the younger and more educated categories that are now either entering the job market in very precarious terms

or that are simply prevented from entering it. Such a situation may resurrect a new middle-class radicalism (Eder, 1995) as a condition for the increment of new forms of participatory democracy or just to sustain the modernization of the actual system. A radicalism that might be more active against certain institutionalized powers and more demanding in relation to the role of the State and its institutions. In spite of the voluntarism vehiculated by this idea I believe that this possible scenario will not lead to the 'death of class' but rather it will move on the reformulation process of this concept. It may also bring forth new actors and new forms of public protest that will mobilize, not only those being exploited in their work, but also those who continue to suffer from oppression and exclusion in the spheres of consumption and citizenship.

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TABLES

TABLE 1 - The General Matrix of Class Locations

<i>Owners of the means of Production</i>		<i>Assets in means of production</i>						
		<i>Non-owners (wage labourers)</i>						
1.Capitalists/ Bourgeoisie		4.Expert Managers		7.Skilled Managers		10.Nonskilled Managers		
Portugal	0,8%	Portugal	2,6%	Portugal	1,2%	Portugal	2,6%	+
USA	1,8%	USA	3,9%	EUA	6,2%	USA	2,3%	
Sweden	0,7%	Sweden	4,4%	Sweden	4,0%	Sweden	2,5%	
Spain	-	Spain	2,5%	Spain	-	Spain(7+10)	4,7%	
2.Small Employers		5. Expert Supervisors		8.Skilled Supervisors		11.Nonskilled Supervisors		
Portugal	7,1%	Portugal	1%	Portugal	0,8%	Portugal	5,3%	
USA	6,0%	USA	3,7%	USA	6,8%	USA	6,9%	> 0
Sweden	4,8%	Sweden	3,8%	Sweden	3,2%	Sweden	3,1%	
Spain (1+2)	3,2%	Spain	1,7%	Spain	-	Spain (8+11)	4,4%	> 0
3.Petty Bourgeoisie		6.Expert Non-managers		9.Skilled Workers		12. Proletarians		
Portugal	22,6% *	Portugal	3,6%	Portugal	5,8%	Portugal	46,5%	-
USA	6,9%	USA	3,4%	USA	12,2%	USA	39,9%	
Sweden	5,4%	Sweden	6,8 %	Sweden	17,8%	Sweden	43,5%	
Spain	23,8%	Spain	4,0%	Spain	18,5%	Spain	37,2%	
*12,4% Rural PB 10,2% NRural PB		+		>0		-		-
		Skill/credential assets						

Portugal N = 1101; EUA N = 1487; Sweden N = 1179; Spain N = 3161 (Gonzalez, 1992: 94).

TABLE 2 - Simple Typology of Class Locations (% gender and countries)

Simple typology of class locations 7 Categories (cells of the General Matrix)	PORTUGAL		Comparison by gender					
	Freq	%	PORT		USA		SWEDEN	
			M	W	M	W	M	W
1. Employers (1 + 2)	87	7,9	10,0	5,3	10,1	5,2	8,2	2,1
2. Petty Bourg (3)	249	22,6	20,4	25,4	6,4	7,5	7,3	3,0
3. Managers (4+7+10)	71	6,4	6,7	6,1	15,5	8,6	15,2	5,5
4. Supervs (5+8+11)	78	7,1	7,7	6,3	18,8	14,2	11,5	7,4
5. Expert N Manags (6)	40	3,6	3,9	3,3	3,0	3,9	6,8	6,8
6. Skilled Workers (9)	64	5,8	3,6	8,6	16,6	7,1	20,2	14,8
7. Proletarians (12)	512	46,5	47,7	45,0	29,0	52,8	30,9	59,6
TOTAL	1101	100,0	55,6	44,4	54,3	45,7	56,0	44,0

TABLE 3 - Comparative Matrixes of Class Consciousness Between four Countries

		PORTUGAL			USA					
		Owners	Non-owners		Owners	Non-owners				
Capita- list		-0,22	1,90	1,30	0,72	-2,17	-2,62	-0,68	-1,09	Manag
	Small Empl	1,17	0,00	2,56	1,93	0,35	-0,73	1,30	2,28	Superv
	P. Bourg	0,94	1,65	1,23	1,45	1,08	0,16	2,67	2,66	N Manag
			Experts	Skilled	Nonskilled		Experts	Skilled	Nonskilled	
		SWEDEN			JAPAN					
		Owners	Non-owners		Owners	Non-owners				
Capita- list		-3,41	-2,36	0,60	1,05	0,17	0,32	2,10	1,83	Mana- ger
	Small Empl	-0,70	0,56	2,07	3,50	0,76	0,68	2,68	1,57	Superv
	P. Bourg	0,87	1,98	4,60	4,61	3,08	1,09	2,61	3,07	N Manag
			Experts	Skilled	Nonskilled		Experts	Skilled	Nonskilled	
			Work class form	Middle cl form	Bourgeois formation					

Source: Portugal: Social Classes Survey. Other countries: Wright, 1997:421

TABLE 4 - Opinions in Favor of State Control over Different Economic Sectors and Services (% of class categories)

<i>Services/ enterprises</i>	<i>Class categories</i>							TOTAL
	Empl.	Petty Bourg.	Manag	Sperv	Expert	Skilled Works	Prolet	
Mail Service	64,8	72,2	62,7	60,0	34,2	61,0	65,4	64,3
Rail Transports	55,9	71,6	40,3	49,3	40,5	47,4	65,0	60,2
Heavy Industry	25,0	45,6	23,7	34,9	22,2	23,5	40,5	36,5
Electric Power Enterp.	50,0	63,2	50,0	44,8	29,7	38,2	58,3	54,3
Banking	24,7	39,4	13,4	25,4	0,0	6,9	32,1	27,9
Hospitals/ Health Care	64,5	71,6	49,3	62,9	52,5	59,7	71,7	67,1
Secondary Education	80,0	84,0	61,8	75,0	72,2	74,1	82,6	79,5
Kindergarten/Pre-elem	60,6	68,3	43,3	47,8	45,7	63,0	62,5	60,1
Shopping Centers	0,0	11,3	4,8	1,5	5,7	1,9	10,7	8,1
Rural Properties	4,5	13,0	9,8	6,1	2,9	3,8	12,9	10,5
Fireman Service	70,8	82,7	67,7	74,6	71,4	70,4	80,4	77,7
Higher Educ/ Univers.	67,1	72,5	50,0	61,4	51,3	65,5	75,8	69,7
Local Health Services	65,7	77,3	60,3	59,7	60,0	64,3	78,1	72,7
Private Clinics	38,5	58,6	36,1	33,8	26,5	25,5	55,1	48,5
Assist. to the Helderly	56,9	69,2	44,3	52,2	40,0	51,8	67,6	62,1
Urban Transports	49,3	58,0	42,4	50,0	40,5	46,6	64,0	56,9
Air Transports	40,3	68,0	34,9	30,8	20,6	38,5	56,7	51,3
Sanitation Services	80,6	87,2	59,4	67,6	71,4	70,7	80,9	78,4

Source: Portuguese Survey on Social Classes

TABLE 5 - Political Positioning on the *spectrum* 'left'/'center'/'right'
(% class categories)

<i>Political positions</i>				
<i>Class categories</i>	Left	Center	Right	TOTALS
Employers	24,7	40,7	34,6	8,2
Petty Bourgeoisie	26,2	27,6	46,2	21,2
Managers	32,9	27,1	40,0	7,1
Supervisors	39,4	35,2	25,4	7,2
Expert N Managers	52,8	27,8	19,4	3,6
Skilled Workers	41,9	37,1	21,0	6,3
Proletarians	43,4	33,6	23,0	46,4
TOTALS	37,4	32,6	30,0	100,0

TABLE 6 - Experience in Associativism (% class categories)*

<i>Types of association</i>					
<i>Class categories</i>	<i>Sportive/ Recreation</i>	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Profissional</i>	<i>Political Parties</i>	<i>Unions</i>
Employers	25,0	8,1	16,7	11,3	5,3
Petty Bourgeoisie	16,5	19,4	14,8	6,8	7,5
Managers	36,7	25,9	40,0	22,2	44,6
Supervisors	32,8	16,1	16,4	13,8	42,2
Expert N Managers	36,1	20,0	20,6	5,9	45,9
Skilled Workers	28,1	14,5	14,5	12,3	48,3
Proletarians	23,3	18,9	6,5	7,6	22,8
TOTALS	24,7	18,2	13,4	9,5	25,1

N=843

* Figures in the cells corresponde to the percentages of answers of individuals who said to be a member each type of association, by class category. The options are not exclusive and so, the sum of answers can be over 100%.

TABLE 7 - Participation on Public Protests in the last 2 years
(% class categories)

<i>Class categories</i>	<i>Type of Protests</i>				
	<i>Union demonst</i>	<i>Political demonst</i>	<i>Other protests</i>	<i>Party Meetings</i>	<i>Strikes *</i>
Employers	9,3	17,6	14,1	33,7	11,0
Petty Bourg	5,5	10,6	7,2	19,9	7,6
Managers	28,6	40,0	34,8	54,3	45,7
Supervisors	15,4	18,4	22,4	26,9	30,8
Expert N Managers	20,5	40,0	43,6	47,5	45,0
Skilled Workers	28,6	42,9	35,5	53,1	57,8
Proletarians	18,6	14,2	20,6	23,8	26,8
TOTALS	16,1	18,3	19,9	28,6	25,6

* The question about strikes didn't referred any temporal limit, but simply asked "have you ever participate on a strike?".